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After Gender:
Tools for Progressives in a Shift
from Sexual Domination to the
Economic Family
Janet Halley*
When transnational law looks at sex, gender, and sexuality
today, what does it identify as “the problem”? I think it is safe
to say that the answer is “male domination, in, through, and as
sexuality”—that is, the core idea of Catherine A. MacKinnon’s
structuralist sexual-subordination feminism (“SSSF” for
purposes of this Essay)—complexified somewhat by some
cultural feminist inputs, such as the idea that women’s
maternal role gives them access to redemptive strategies that
men cannot be counted on to understand.1 The papers collected
in this Symposium suggest, however, that this delimitation of
“the problem” is itself a problem—that at the very least, the
remedial imaginary of transnational law needs to add a
concern for the dominations that occur in and as gender (and
thus to add a more positive project on behalf of men and
masculinity as sites of deprivation and injury) and in and as
the repression of nonnormative sexuality (and thus to work on
behalf of sexual minorities and erotic liberation generally).2 I
*
Many thanks to Darren Rosenblum for organizing this Symposium
and to the Pace Law Review editors for their patient work converting it to
print. © Janet Halley.
1. The latter appears in transitional-justice projects, where the idea that
women are pacific agents has found a foothold, and in development agendas
that identify women as the preferred target of entrepenurializing economic
reform strategies. Though these are very significant new forms of governance
feminism, I set them aside in this Introduction.
2. I use “gender” here to indicate the whole range of social practices
distributing maleness and femaleness, masculinity and femininity, and every
elaboration of the relations between these ideal modes of human
performance; their social mutabilities and fixities; and their various
relationships to power. I do not include in my use of the term the currently
canonical feminist-internationalist sense of the term to refer to the “socially
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think that many Symposium contributors have the intuition
that the SSS feminists “got there first” with their ideas about
sexuality as domination, and that we are in a deep game of
catch-up. I believe the alliance between structuralist feminists
working against male domination through sex and sexuality,
on one hand, and social conservatives working to enforce their
ideas of sexual morality, on the other, makes us feel
outnumbered, outgunned.
But there are many ways in which contributions to this
Symposium map well onto the structuralist feminist idea of
what international law is and is good for. When Hilary
Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelly Wright set forth
the reform template in their seminal 1991 article Feminist
Approaches to International Law, they clearly understood that
human rights were the best wedge for piercing the
private/public distinction.3 Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright
took aim at a private/public distinction that constructs the
masculine as the public and the feminine as the private;
international law as the public and sovereign autonomy as its
private; objectivity as a public virtue and subjectivity as a
private one; and public affairs as the concern of international
law and the suffering of women in daily life as the private, the
local, housed within the sovereign. Human rights, which
purport at least to commit nation states internationally to
manage the populations within their own borders in accord
with declared minima for the conduct of daily life, constituted
the ideal instrument for piercing this distinction, for
infiltrating international law with feminist thinking and
feminist projects and for tethering autonomous sovereigns to
its prescriptions. It was also a way of pressuring Western
societies to adopt those prescriptions: having held them high as
constructed,” as opposed to “given,” dimensions of the M/F distinction. This
latter definition of gender implies the sexual-subordination idea; it presumes
the domination of F by M not only in, but as, culture. For a discussion of this
idea as feminists partially installed it in the Rome Statute, see Janet Halley,
Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related
Violence in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L.1 (2009).
3. Christine Chinkin, Hilary Charlesworth & Shelley Wright, Feminist
Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613, 625-34, 638-43
(1991).
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ideals for the third—or developing—world, first-world or
developed nations could be shamed into adopting them as their
own. The turn to human rights fit well within the focus on
political and civil rights that has conventionally fallen within
the comfort zone of the internationalist North and West.
Women’s participation (political rights) and relief from sexual
domination figured as the elimination of discrimination (civil
rights) would do the trick; there was no need to deal deeply
with social and economic factors which could lead one to think
in the disfavored register of social and economic rights.
That, at least, was the idea. And it still is: I think it
animates much of the work by participants in this Symposium
and their allies within human rights law and humanitarian
law. We want to work within the basic internationalist feminist
framework, but we want to do it with dysphorias and utopias
about sex, gender, and sexuality that depart—mildly or
radically—from the SSSF idea. This Symposium has been a
wonderfully rich sharing of our best ideas for how to do that.
In introducing this Symposium, I want to suggest one way
to depart from (and not discard!) that basic template. I refer to
the “Up Against Family Law Exceptionalism (UAFLE)” project
which I have helped to develop over the last several years with
many collaborators.4 In this project, we agree that the
4. For an introduction to the Up Against Family Law Exceptionalism
conference, see Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in
Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family
Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010) [hereinafter Halley & Rittich, Critical
Directions]. That article introduces a special issue of the American Journal of
Comparative Law which I edited, entitled Critical Directions in Comparative
Family Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. (2010). It contains essays emerging from the
UAFLE conference. For the genealogy of Family Law Exceptionalism, see
Duncan Kennedy, Savigny’s Family/Patrimony Distinction and its Place in
the Global Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 811
(2010); Isabel J. Jaramillo, The Social Approach to Family Law: Conclusions
from the Canonical Family Law Treatises of Latin America, 58 AM. J. COMP.
L. 8 (2010); Philomila Tsoukala, Marrying Family Law to the Nation, 58 AM.
J. COMP. L. 873 (2010); and Lama Abu Odeh, Honor Killings and the
Construction of Gender in Arab Societies, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 911 (2010). For
studies of the modern economic family, see Hila Shamir, The State of Care:
Rethinking the Distributive Effects of Familial Care Policies in Liberal
Welfare States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 953 (2010); Chantal Thomas, Migrant
Domestic Workers in Egypt: A Case Study of the Economic Family in Global
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private/public distinction that Charlesworth, Chinkin, and
Wright identified as the problem is an ideological scrim. But we
go on to observe ways in which human rights traverses the
global scene with problematic, and not necessarily redemptive,
force. And we suggest that the household can be an alternative
frame—semiautonomous from sex, gender and sexuality—
within which to figure out emancipation projects, to identify
constituencies on whose behalf one can meaningfully spend
one’s energies, and to locate legal levers with which to help
them.
My message: we are not just up against SSSF—we are also
up against family law exceptionalism. We are UAFLE!
In setting out briefly the potential rewards of this turn, I
am first going to set forth a historical account of how family
law exceptionalism (FLE) emerged (Part I below); then suggest
some analytic procedures for dealing with it (Part II below);
and then, finally, apply those procedures to an international
law project in which SSSF has played an important formative
role—the new trafficking regime (Part III).
I. How Family Law Came to Exist, and to Be Exceptional
The private/public distinction, as William Blackstone
constructed it in 1765, was remarkably different from our own.5

Context, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 987 (2010) [hereinafter Thomas, Migrant
Domestic Workers in Egypt]; Kerry Rittich, Black Sites: Locating the Family
and Family Law in Development, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 1023 (2010); and the
articles by Philomila Tsoukala and Lama Abu Odeh just cited. For an
overview of what we sought as “Critical Directions in Comparative Family
Law,” see Fernanda G. Nicola, Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative
Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010); and for a critical assessment of FLE as a
linchpin for core/periphery dynamics in law, see Maria Rosaria Marella, 19
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721 (2011). Works in progress include
Hedayat Heikal, Family as Jurisdiction: From Dispossession to the Family in
Colonial Algeria (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author);
Sylvia Kang’ara, Western Legal Ideas in African Family Law (2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author); Yun-Ru Chen,
Maneuvering Modernity: Family Law as a Battlefield in Colonial Taiwan
(2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
5. The following six paragraphs compress and revise passages from
Janet Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. &
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In his book on the Rights of Persons, the first chapter is
devoted to the “Absolute Rights of Individuals.” Here is the
harbinger of the general individual of modern liberalism.6 But
following this, we encounter a series of explicitly public kinds of
persons: Parliament,7 King,8 the King’s Royal Family,9 through
to “the People, whether Aliens, Denizens, or Natives,”10 and
concluding with “the Military and Maritime States.”11
Blackstone then turned to a series of “private oeconomical
relations”: master and servant, husband and wife, parent and
child, guardian and ward, and corporations.12 Note that
“marriage” is only his second “private relation of persons”;
master and servant come first. The “private oeconomical
relations” housed what we would now call employment
marriage
(husband/wife),
parentage
(master/servant),
(parent/child), and wardship (guardian and ward).13 It also
housed corporations.
A brief etymological digression is needed to get us back to
what Blackstone could have meant by calling these relations
“oeconomical.” The term derives ultimately from the ancient
Greek word οίκοσ14 and is our etymological root for the term
economy.15 At the time Blackstone used the term, it meant “of
or relating to household management, or to the ordering of
private affairs; domestic.”16 Later, early in the nineteenth
HUMAN. 1, 7-9 (2011).
6. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *121 (photo. reprint 1979)
(1765).
7. Id. at *146.
8. Id. at *190.
9. Id. at *218.
10. Id. at *366.
11. Id. at *407.
12. Id. at *422, *466 (emphasis in original).
13. See id. at *422-66.
14. Oeconomus Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/130498 (last visited Nov. 21,
2011).
15. Economy Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/59393 (last visited Nov. 21,
2011).
16. Economic Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, B.1.a.,
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/59384 (last visited Nov. 21,
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century, a new sense of the word emerged: one “relating to the
management of domestic or private income and expenditure.”17
In this economy, husband and wife, parent and child, guardian
and ward, master and servant (master and slave, where
slavery was recognized, although not in Blackstone’s England)
lived out their hierarchical lives; reciprocal, not equal, rights
prevailed. These legal relations were, moreover, no more or less
economical than corporations. Beyond the world of legal
concepts, considered as an architectural space and a social
form, this classification invokes not the home or the family but
the household, a space for both human and material
production, for the making, consumption, and distribution of
wealth and material goods. The legal distinction between the
family and the market finds no expression in this legal or social
order; the future trajectory of the word “economy” is one index
of its gradual, as-yet-unforeseen emergence within it.
By 1870, when American legal minds had finally put this
classification completely to rest, the modern uses of the word
“economic” had turned it from the household to the market. By
the mid-nineteenth-century we begin to see uses of
“economical” to mean “of, relating to, or concerned with the
science of economics or with the economy in general; relating to
the development and regulation of the material resources of a
community or state.”18 By the time classical legal thought took
hold, “economic” had completely ceased to refer to the
household and was primarily a term for monetary, financial,
and commercial relations, with a smattering of meanings tying
it to thrift and good management of those relations.19 That is to

2011). The OED declares that this sense of the word “economic” is obsolete,
and gives a final example dated 1791. Id.
17. Id. at B.1.b.
18. Id. at B.4.a. The OED first example of “economic” used to describe a
national economic system dates from 1815. Id.
19. In addition to the senses quoted above, see id., at B.3.a. (“Esp. of a
person: characterized by thrift (sometimes, parsimony); careful in the
management of financial resources”; the first example of this use is dated
1755): B.3.b. (“Characterized by or tending to economy in the use of
resources; efficient, not wasteful”; the first example of this use is dated 1794):
B.4.c. (“Relating to the generation of income; maintained for the sake of
profit”; the first example of this use is dated 1854).
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say, the word “economic” had been completely captured for the
market.
Over the longue durée of the rise of liberal capitalism,
another word went through similarly significant changes: the
word family. It derives from the Latin term for servant or slave
(famulus), and its first English meaning was “[t]he servants of
a house or establishment; the household.”20 Not the domestic
space as a whole; not husband and wife/parent and child: just
the servants. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) indicates
that this sense is quite old—the earliest example dates from
1400—and that it is obsolete; it provides no examples after
1794. But we could add an example from 1839, a rare item in
the Harvard Law Library, its first book on file titled “Family
Law.” This title shows that it still made sense then to think of
the family as a managerial network rather than a domestic
space: The Family Law Advisor: Containing Plain Advice to
Landlord and Tenant . . . Master and Servant . . . Executors
and Administrators . . . To Make a Will . . . .21
The next sense to emerge was “[t]he body of persons who
live in one house or under one head, including parents,
children, servants, etc.”22 In 1631, Star Chamber heard a case
involving a man of whom it was said, “[h]is family were himself
and his wife and daughters, two mayds, and a man.”23 This
sense emerged in the mid-sixteenth century; the OED does not
20. Family Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/67975 (last visited Nov. 21,
2011).
21. HENRY WASHBOURNE, THE FAMILY LAW ADVISOR: CONTAINING PLAIN
ADVICE TO LANDLORD AND TENANT . . . MASTER AND SERVANT . . . EXECUTORS AND
ADMINISTRATORS . . . TO MAKE A WILL . . . (1839). The ellipses in the title do not
reflect omissions but rather appear on the title page and in the official entry
in the Harvard Hollis catalogue. Hollis describes this entry as “[a] publisher’s
collection of four of his own separately issued popular law manuals, here
bound up (without original title leaves) with a general title.” Hollis Entry for
THE FAMILY LAW ADVISOR: CONTAINING PLAIN ADVICE TO LANDLORD AND
TENANT . . . MASTER AND SERVANT . . . EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS . . . TO
MAKE
A
WILL
.
.
.
,
HARVARD
COLLEGE
LIBRARY,
http://discovery.lib.harvard.edu/?itemid=|library/m/aleph|002032951
(last
visited Aug. 19, 2011). Clearly someone thought that this collection of topics
made sense to the law-book-buying public.
22. Family Definition, supra note 20, at I.2.a.
23. Id.
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say it is obsolete but gives no examples after 1859, the eve of
the American Civil War. And surely it is obsolete; when we now
read about antebellum Southern slave-owners expressing
concern for “[m]y family, black and white,”24 the expression
strikes us as the absolute height of hypocrisy, but I think we
have to face it: to them it was merely descriptive.
So before the Civil War, “family” still meant the household,
with its relations of husband and wife, parent and child, and
master and servant. So far, the “family” cohered well with
Blackstone’s “private oeconomical relations.” But after the Civil
War, servants were decidedly dropped from the referent of
“family”: the standard sense of the word became “[t]he group of
persons consisting of the parents and their children, whether
actually living together or not; in wider sense, the unity formed
by those who are nearly connected by blood or affinity.”25 The
OED quotes James Mill referring in 1869 to the still smaller
unit sometimes called the companionate, nuclear, or bourgeois
family: “The group which consists of a Father, Mother and
Children, is called a Family.”26
Over the course of these etymological transitions, the
words economy and family travelled along chiasmatic
trajectories. From a single household that was both economic
and familial, the English lexicon gradually moved to sever
these two characteristics: the household became the family and
in the process became not-economic; and the economic became

24. See ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD:
BLACK AND WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH 32, 100-01, 133, 204 (1988).
25. Family Definition, supra note 20, at I.3.a. From the earliest to the
latest dates comprised by this story, an additional, always less salient
meaning also existed: “Those descended or claiming descent from a common
ancestor; a house, kindred, lineage.” Id. at I.4.a. Almost all the examples tip
the term in the direction of aristocratic lineage: “People of no ‘family.’” Id. at
I.4.b. (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING, AS
APPLIED TO SPECIAL JURIES, PARTICULARLY IN CASES OF LIBEL LAW 146 (1821)).
This is the sense in which Savigny used the term. See generally FRIEDRICH
CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW (William Holloway
trans., Hyperion Press 1979) (1867). But there was no useable sense of
“family” at this time, in America, to correspond with the affinal patriarchal
family which was Savigny’s actual object of attention. Id.
26. Id. at I.3.a. (quoting 2 JAMES MILL, ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENA OF
THE HUMAN MIND 218 (1869)).
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the market and in the process not-familial. Millions of
unnamed users of the English language gradually drew a
market/family
distinction—indeed,
a
market/family
opposition—that is completely harmonious with liberal
capitalism and separate spheres ideology. It is hard to believe
that these coincidences are purely accidental; instead, I am
going to posit them as symptomatic of modernist ideology.
Another transition, this one specifically legal, was
simultaneously underway, one that allocated contract to the
market and status to the family, and that posited the
transnational character of the former and the national
character of the latter. These new meanings were specifically
legal, and were sedimented onto the family/market distinction
during the rise of classical legal thought, the dominant mode of
imagining law in the latter half of the nineteenth century.27
What follows is a highly compressed summary of the place of
the family and family law in colonialism28 and postcolonial
nationalism,29 focusing on work done in and around the
UAFLE project by Duncan Kennedy, Maria Rosaria Marella,
Philomila Tsoukala, Yun-Ru Chen, Hedayat Heikal, Sylvia
Kang’ara, and many others.30
As Kennedy shows in a close reading of some seminal
pages by Friedrich Carl von Savigny, an immensely influential
legal thinker of the nineteenth-century German Historical
School, the global spread of German legal ideas during the rise
of classical legal thought carried to every corner of the world a
27. For the classic account of classical legal thought in American legal
consciousness, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT (1975). Kennedy describes classical legal thought as a global wave
of influence in Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal
Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006)
[hereinafter Kennedy, Three Globalizations].
28. Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of
Egypt, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1043 (2004); JUDITH SURKIS, Civilization
and the Civil Code: The Scandal of “Child Marriage” in French Algeria, in
SCANDALOUS SUBJECTS: INTIMACY AND INDECENCY IN FRANCE AND FRENCH
ALGERIA (forthcoming).
29. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Women, in THE NATION AND
ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES 113 (1993).
30. See supra note 4.
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pattern highly compatible with the lexical and ideological shifts
I have just outlined.31 Kennedy reveals how Savigny’s System
of the Modern Roman Law was expressly concerned to pitch
family law against the law of obligations (the law of contract
and property) and to make this distinction both profound and
rich with signification.32 Summarizing Kennedy’s analysis,
Kerry Rittich and I derived what we have called the Savignian
pattern, pitching paired opposites against each other:
Family Law

Contract Law

Family Law as the Domain

Contract Law as the Domain

of Status

of Will

Family Law as Universal

Contract Law as Particular in

in the Sense that it is

the Sense that Every

Fundamental Everywhere

Contract is Unique

Family Law as Particular

Contract Law as Universal in

in the Sense that Each

the Sense that it is the Same

Nation’s Family Law

Everywhere

Expresses the Spirit of the
People

The Savignian pattern posits a conceptual dependency of
31. This paragraph, including the chart on the next page, is derived from
Halley & Rittich, Critical Directions, supra note 4, at 757.
32. Kennedy, supra note 4 (giving an analysis of FRIEDRICH CARL VON
SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW (William Holloway trans.,
Hyperion Press 1979) (1867)).
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the family and contract on each other; they are mutually
constitutive. As Kennedy also shows, Savigny’s taxonomy had a
long life; through the globally pervasive influence of the
German historical school in the mid-nineteenth century, it
continued to influence the development of legal thought long
after the legal world for which he wrote it had disappeared.
And when modern capitalism picked up and resignified the
Savignian pattern, it generated a crucial ordering role for the
family in the rise of the colonial system and of its modern
sequels.
This pattern emerged repeatedly in the colonial and
postcolonial contexts—not always of course, and persistently
with highly distinct features that require close local study.
Still, it may be safe to generalize colonial/postcolonial FLE this
way: colonial powers considered it important to establish
transnational rules and jurisdictional structures for the
administration of commerce and to ensure that, as far as
possible, those rules and institutions would conform with
European law (Savigny’s law of obligations). At the same time,
they either made deals with local elites to keep their hands off
genuinely local law, which turned out again and again to be the
law of husband and wife, parent and child, marriage, divorce,
and sometimes inheritance (Savigny’s family law), or simply
forgot the law of the household because it did not interfere with
their projects.33 Colonial elites and postcolonial nationalists
again and again (although not always) found in the Savignian
pattern a reason to frame the rules governing their households
as “family law”—which had to remain untouched by imperial
interference because it expressed the spirit of the people—
while figuring out ways to maintain the integration of law
governing commerce with European legal sources. The fact
that, in many non-Western contexts, the household was still

33. For an account of intense colonial management of family law in
Christian Sub-Saharan Africa, see Kang’ara, Western Legal Ideas in African
Family Law, supra note 4. Abu-Odeh gives an account in which the Islamic
rules of marriage and divorce, and of parental rights and duties, were ignored
by the architects of English indirect rule in Egypt, effectively residualizing
what was later to become housed in Egyptian Personal Status Law or “family
law.” See Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Egyptian Family Law, supra note 28.
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fully economic and the law of husband and wife (and so on)
were not categorically distinct from the law of commerce did
not matter: to modernize meant to find some way to
accommodate the distinction.34 We are left with a family that is
in fact exceptionalized from the market—and that is not. FLE
is both real and a mirage.
At the same time, in the colonial order, sexual wrongs
against women remained a matter for the colonist’s concern.
Targeting footbinding, sati, and child marriage demonized the
patriarchal culture of the colony, legitimating colonial
intervention not only in the family but tout court. Lurid sexual
dominations occurring in the East and the South were not, like
the family, relegated to the local; their laws ran the gamut
from colonial prohibition to colonial administration.35
Feminists were quick to reimport the condemnation,
analogizing coverture, registered prostitution, and the sexual
double standard at home with practices officially denounced
only when located far away.36 I am sure I am not the first to
detect precursors of today’s SSSF constructs in human rights in
these colonial morals campaigns.
Why is this story worth telling today? Because we still live
in the world constructed by a family/market distinction nested
in a national/international distinction. In that distinction, the
family is presumptively local and indigenous; in the rise of
nationalism it became national. This was part of an emerging
modern international order that simultaneously secured the
assumption that the law of the market was or should be
smoothly transnational. The family was never private: it was
one term in a division of legal authority on an international
scale.
34. For a dramatic account of the merger of Savigny’s two columns in
pre-contact Chinese law, see Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations
and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese
Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599 (2000).
35. For a detailed account focusing on British imperial practice in India,
see Janaki Nair, ‘Social Reform’ and the Woman’s Question, in WOMEN AND
LAW IN COLONIAL INDIA: A SOCIAL HISTORY 49-68 (2000).
36. ELIZABETH W. ANDREW & KATHARINE C. BUSHNELL, THE QUEEN’S
DAUGHTERS IN INDIA (1899). Thanks to Prabha Kotiswaran for bringing this
rich source to my attention.
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II. Tearing Away the Scrim: How to Notice the Economic
Family
James Q. Whitman cleverly notes that what we now call
family law was, in pre-modern and early-modern Europe, the
equivalent of our contemporary law of mergers and
acquisitions. The economic significance of marriage, parentage,
and related elements of the legal order is now scaled down from
the state and the princely household, and broadened to the
population. Thanks in part to FLE, it has disappeared. But it
has not gone away. Hence the second part of the UAFLE
project: The Economic Family.
The hypothesis here is that the “family” is a mystified but
crucial economic factor. Its law—the body of rules that directly
govern adult/adult dependent intimacy and parentage—is an
historical accident, but we have it now. In the UAFLE project,
we have developed a series of tools for undoing the ideological
effects flowing from the construction of family and family law
in FLE terms.37 I will set out two of them here.
One is to undo the construction of family law by extending
our topic beyond the bounds they have been given in the
emergence of FLE. We call the law that happened to fall within
family law Family Law 1. There is a lot of law that directly
regulates the family contained within legal topics commonly
understood to be both economically significant and nonfamilial:
employment law; the law governing social security programs,
both public (welfare) and private (pensions and the like);
immigration law; criminal law; tax law; and the list could go
on. For instance, a spouse typically is legally entitled to a
deceased spouse’s unpaid retirement plan funds; such a
provision may be more decisive to the ongoing life of a
household than, say, a Family Law 1 regime like divorce. We
call that law Family Law 2. And we consider law that helps to
set the bargaining terms of family members with each other,
with employers, and so on, but that is silent about family

37. For a full account, see Halley & Rittich, Critical Directions, supra
note 4, 761-67. The following two paragraphs are compressed and revised
from these pages.

13

900

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

relationships, to be equally relevant, though hidden by FLE in
the background. For instance, in the U.S., public school funding
is typically local, so that the quality of public education is
tethered to the wealth or poverty of the school district in which
schools are located and funded; and a child is entitled to attend
public schools only in the school district where he or she
resides. As a result, families with children strive to live in the
best school district they can afford, and they hold onto their
homes even if divorce, bankruptcy, or their own job locations
make doing so catastrophically costly for them. The school
funding and attendance laws do not mention families or family
law. But they have such a significant impact on the class
strategies of actual parents that it seems almost insane not to
consider them Family Law. We call law with this “disparate
impact” on family behavior Family Law 3. Figuring out how
these three domains of family law interact is one way of
undoing the tendency of FLE to hide the economic functions of
the family.
A second pathway is to undo the construction of the social
family to take into account dependency relations that
intertwine those of spouses, legal cohabitants, and parent and
child but that did not make it into the legal family. The term
“family” entrenches marriage and parentage and occludes
many additional and/or alternative economic relations that are
continually routing through the domestic space. We are not
talking about the much-vaunted effort to get recognition and
legal “dignity” for nonnormative relationships; this is a purely
descriptive project. Merely to describe, we need to get beyond
the family. Where to?
Working from a definition of the modern household
developed by neo-Marxist World Systems theorists Immanuel
Wallerstein and Joan Smith, we add to the term “family” a
quite different term: the “household.”38 Usefully, Wallerstein
and Smith deem a household to be a human association
bounded through social negotiation and aimed at securing
38. Immanuel Wallerstein & Joan Smith, Households as an Institution
of the World-Economy, in CREATING AND TRANSFORMING HOUSEHOLDS: THE
CONSTRAINTS OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 3, 7, 11, 13 (1992). Thanks to Meredith
Petrin for bringing this source to my attention.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/9

14

2011]

AFTER GENDER

901

human reproduction, including reproduction from day to day of
its members as well as the production of new human beings. In
liberal economic orders, it is an important source of social
security. In modern capitalism, it is a crucial site of
consumption. It may be either larger or smaller than the
legally recognized family, may include non-family members,
and may be made up of people with no recognized family
relationship to each other. All household members may live in
the same residence, or they may not. What is crucial is that
households pool income and labor resources in that they
allocate work responsibilities and income streams among
household members for the purposes of reproducing both
existing and new humans, securing social security, and
contextualizing and distributing the costs and benefits of
consumption.
In the Wallerstein/Smith model, any one person may be a
member of more than one household. The polygamous husband
and the live-in nanny can be examples, but so can young adults
living in a university dormitory where students cook meals for
one another but return home for vacations.
Above all, the household is economic both in the sense
that it has an internal economy that can be studied and in the
sense that it is continuous with the market economy—
including the informal economy39—in which it is inextricably
embedded and with which it engages in myriad dynamic
transactions.
III. Applying the Tools to a Problem in the International Legal
Recognition of Sex, Sexuality, and Gender
To conclude, I want to apply the tools described in Part II
of this Introduction to an important real-world phenomenon
which, I think, SSSF got wrong: trafficking of the sex worker.40
39. A key tool of the UAFLE project has been to attend not only to
formal, but to informal relationships; not only to formal but to informal
markets. The work of Chantal Thomas is consistently acute here. See, e.g.,
Thomas, Migrant Domestic Workers in Egypt, supra note 4.
40. For an account of the SSSF approach to the international legal
prohibition of trafficking, see Chantal Thomas in Janet Halley, Prabha
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If we collaborate with FLE, the migratory sex worker is
completely different from the migratory nanny. The household
labor that the nanny does and the sex work that the sex worker
does inhabit distinct domains: one works in the home and the
other in the market. On a moral or an equality-oriented metric,
one engages in labor that is perceived as unproblematic while
the other engages in highly problematic labor. Nothing could be
more different than taking care of kids for pay and giving a
stranger a blow job for pay. But let us unpin that. We can see
marriage as a complex exchange that includes bargained-for
sex that is only ideationally distinct from bargained-for sex
obtained in the market.41 And we can make both of those
continuous with the problem of finding someone to care for
children, the ill, and the elderly. From the point of view of a
young, economically desperate woman taking the plunge into
illegal migration, there is actually a decision to be made here:
which of these forms of labor is more or less unbearable, more
or less remunerative, safer/more dangerous, etc.?
Now, following the lead of many of the contributions to this
Symposium, we can unpin the presumption that our migratory
heroine is gendered female: we can make him male. We can
now put migration for work in construction, mining,
agriculture, or industry on a continuum with our nanny/sex
worker.
All of these figures, moreover, participate in households:
the households from which they migrate and the households
into which they migrate. For the nanny, this pattern is
especially interesting because the second of these households is
usually seen as someone else’s family. Part of the project here is
to specify the foreground and background rules that sustain
the working conditions and wages of these different figures,
and to give the households in which they pool income their due

Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal Thomas, From the International to the
Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex
Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 335, 349-51, 388-93 (2006).
41. Prabha Kotiswaran, Wives and Whores: Prospects for a Feminist
Theory of Distribution, in SEXUALITY AND THE LAW: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS
283 (Vanessa E. Munro & Carl F. Stychin eds., 2007).
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as crucial nexuses of their welfare. Case studies in the UAFLE
project have demonstrated, I think conclusively, that the legal
regimes relevant to the migrant nanny, for instance, are, at a
minimum: immigration law, labor/employment law (from which
she is likely to be present by her absence), welfare law, and
family law of the destination country; almost all of these in the
country of origin, and finally the international legal regimes
regulating labor migration.42 For the migrant sex worker who
lives and works in a brothel, substitute the brothel for the
family, and do the analysis again from the top. And for the
migrant miner, substitute the company dormitory for the
brothel and the family, and do it yet again.
These re-framings are important because they open up the
possibility of performing a distributive analysis of the relative
advantage and disadvantage enjoyed and suffered by
economically desperate migrants. They constitute the first step
in identifying the bargaining endowments of differentlysituated migrants. The safety and danger of their migration
and their work do not depend abstractly on the label we attach
to their endpoint work sector—prostitution/work sex, domestic
work, agricultural work—but on specific pathways by which
they deal with pervasively coercive economic need.
What was it about SSSF ideology that took these moves off
the table? I think the narrowing of the migratory labor picture
that we see there is attributable to several ideological
commitments. One of them is a strong preference, almost
categorical, for female constituencies. Another is a continuing
commitment to the sexual-subordination thesis, either with or
without exceptions allowing for nontrafficked prostitution.43
But another, hidden in the deep background, is the
family/market distinction. Migratory female labor destined to
sex work is represented in the SSSF paradigm to be
categorically unlike migratory female labor destined to
domestic service; and both of these are represented, in turn, to
be completely unlike migratory male labor destined for work in
labor markets, whether formal or informal. Unpinning FLE
42. See, e.g., Shamir, supra note 4; Thomas, supra note 4.
43. Thomas in Halley et al., supra note 40, at 349-51, 388-93.

17

904

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

helps to reveal continuities between these phenomena and
enables us to develop descriptive and normative projects that
span various distances along the resulting continuum.
I am going to run that analytic on a centerpiece of SSSF
law reform in the international sphere: the trafficking regime.
In the SSSF representation of international trafficking,
facilitating prostitution in any way is per se trafficking because
prostitution exemplifies sexual domination: it is all-inclusive.
Trafficking of women and girls into prostitution and other
segments of the sex industry fully occupies the field of illegal
trafficking: it is all-exclusive. The trafficking of men into
prostitution does not warrant anything approaching the
concern granted to the trafficking of women and girls into
prostitution. The trafficking of women into domestic labor goes
unmentioned. The trafficking of men and women into seriously
exploitative work that lacks any particular gender ordering
drops off the agenda completely.
The legal tools are criminalization and rescue. The
primary goal is to use the international criminal law and the
international human rights system to require and/or recruit
states to abolish sex work at the international level and at the
level of national law. Inasmuch as abolition is the declared
goal,
criminal
law
tools—criminalizing
traffickers,
“criminalizing demand”—occupy the horizon of the legal tools
imagined to be useful to protect the project’s preferred victims.
And inasmuch as prostitution is identical to sexual slavery on a
collapsed continuum of sexual injury,44 women’s choices to
participate in it are themselves evidence of their domination in
the sexual order: will they or nil they, they must be removed
from prostitution even if that means returning them to the
conditions from which they fled into it.
Propounders of SSSF immediately took note when the
relatively rich and powerful countries of the global North and
West sought treaty commitments from the relatively poor and
weak countries of the global East and South to stanch the flow

44. Sharon Marcus, Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and
Politics of Rape Prevention, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 385, 389
(Judith Butler & Joan Scott eds., 1992).
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of unwanted migration into the former from the latter.
Discussions leading to the 2000 Palermo Protocols focused on
two forms of trade that the powerful nations wanted to
constrain: human migration from the developing world into the
developed world, and arms trafficking. Palermo was a large
initiative aimed at expanding international criminal law in
part by boosting it with expanded domestic border control.
Three protocols emanated from the Palermo meetings: a
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, especially Women and Children; a Protocol against
the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and Protocol
against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms,
Their Parts and Components and Ammunition.45 The
signatories promised to criminalize the illegal weapons trade,
human smuggling, and human trafficking.
Structuralist sexual-subordination feminists organized a
vigorous effort at Vienna, where the Protocols were drafted, to
influence the trafficking protocol; feminists who disagreed with
SSSF on almost every key point of their program mobilized
promptly to exert counter-influence; and U.N. agencies and
NGOs seeking to advance the cause of human rights struggled
to convert a border control initiative into a human rights
victory at best and to forestall a human rights debacle at worst.
Overall, their conjoint influence was swamped by the will of the
developed world to recruit the developing world into a world
with stronger borders, pinned down more intensely by criminal
law at the international and the national levels. But precisely
because the trafficking piece of Palermo mattered so much to
these feminist pugilists, extremely divergent feminist projects
came away from Palermo sharing a stake—sometimes
overlapping, sometimes conflicting—in the trafficking regime.
45. Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A.
Res. 55/255, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/255 (May 31, 2001); Protocol Against
the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex III,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Smuggling Protocol];
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially
Women and Children, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25
(Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Trafficking Protocol].
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As Anne Gallagher explains in her magesterial treatise on
the international trafficking regime, the Palermo Trafficking
Protocol provides a tripartite definition of trafficking: to be
trafficking, a practice must exhibit a prohibited act, a
prohibited means, and a prohibited purpose.46 The prohibited
acts are “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring
or receipt of persons.”47 The prohibited means are “the threat or
use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or a position of vulnerability or
of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person.”48 The
prohibited purpose is “exploitation.”49 The nonexhaustive list of
prohibited purposes begins with “the exploitation of the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,”
followed by “forced labour or services, slavery or practices
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”50
This definition of trafficking gives prostitution pride of
place among the prohibited purposes—a clear SSSF victory.
But the prohibited means deny the SSSF axiom that
prostitution is per se coerced, a categorical defeat for SSSF.
More ambiguously, the Trafficking Protocol makes “the
exploitation of the prostitution of others” a form of exploitation:
it is not clear whether this redundancy renders prostitution per
se a form of exploitation (the SSSF reading) or whether
prostitution must be tainted with exploitation to constitute
exploitation (the liberal/non-structuralist feminist reading).
The Trafficking Protocol requires practices that facilitate
prostitution (and other purposes) to be classified as trafficking
if they involve “the abuse of power or of a position of
46. ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN
TRAFFICKING 78 (2010).
47. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 3(a).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Article Three also provides that, where a prohibited means is
employed, the consent of a trafficked person does not take the practice out of
the definition of trafficking, id. at art. 3(b), and that children are victims of
trafficking whenever a prohibited act conjoins with a prohibited purpose, id.
at art. 3(c). The prohibited means are irrelevant to the definition of child
trafficking.
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vulnerability.”51 SSSF deems these elements to be supplied per
se by the sexual subordination inherent in prostitution, but the
more sex-positive and/or liberal feminist opposition would look
here for evidence of social or economic dominance or
vulnerability stemming from dynamics other than the
“purpose” of prostitution alone.52 As between the feminists at
Palermo, this provision was a draw.
United Nations agencies dedicated to human rights
protection and human rights NGOs, meanwhile, were alarmed
that trafficking had come to the attention of the countries of
the developed world as a crime and border control issue. They
intervened directly in the Vienna discussions and sought to
strengthen human rights recognition and enforcement within
the developing trafficking and smuggling Protocols. Observers
sympathetic with this effort consistently conclude that the
bitter and protracted battles over the place of prostitution in
the definition of trafficking, pitting SSS feminists against
human rights NGOs, materially weakened the latter in their
larger battle to convert the Trafficking and Smuggling
Protocols into human rights instruments.53
Meanwhile, the Clinton Administration and Congress had
become concerned that the U.S. was becoming the unwilling
recipient of illegal labor migration, and, increasingly during
the late 1990s, trafficking became a consensus way for
opposing political forces to capitalize on U.S. border control
anxieties. SSS feminists, religious conservatives, and antiimmigration forces could all decry trafficking and get behind
legislation to criminalize it. The result was the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA).54 This statute commits
51. Id. at art. 3(a).
52. See Thomas in Halley et al., supra note 40, at 347-60.
53. Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral
Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 447 (2006);
Anne Gallagher, Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking
and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 100203 (2001); Thomas in Halley et al., supra note 40, at 438-60.
54. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-386, div. A, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8, 18, 22 U.S.C. (2006)). The TVPA has since been revisited and altered three
times. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of
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the U.S. to criminal anti-trafficking efforts and makes U.S.
foreign aid dependent on receiving countries’ compliance with
“minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.”55 To
warrant retention in the United States’ favor, countries “should
prohibit severe forms of trafficking in persons and punish acts
of such trafficking.”56 The TVPA established a Trafficking in
Persons (TIP) Office of the State Department to produce
annual TIP reports on countries around the world, assessing
the degree to which they meet the TVPA’s minimum standards
for reducing severe forms of trafficking. Countries are ranked
in a three-tier scale; U.S. development and security aid is
categorically denied to Tier 3 states.
In the making of the TVPA, the SSSF agenda was, again,
relatively successful in installing its preferred focus on the
abolition of prostitution. The TVPA defines “severe forms of
trafficking in persons” to mean:
(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act
is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which
the person induced to perform such act has not
attained 18 years of age; or
(B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation,
provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or
services, though the use of force, fraud, or
coercion for the purpose of subjection to
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or
slavery.57
A person who is subjected to any of these acts is a “victim of a

2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (codified in scattered sections of 8,
18, 22 U.S.C.); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA)
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (2006) (codified in scattered
sections of 18, 22, 42 U.S.C.); William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044
(codified in scattered sections of 6, 8, 18, 22, 42 U.S.C.).
55. TVPA § 108(A).
56. Id. § 108(A)(1).
57. Id. § 103(8).
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severe form of trafficking.”58 Once again, the SSSF aim of
defining commercial sex as per se trafficking went down to
defeat. But in another way, SSSF got better traction in the
definition of trafficking in Washington than it did in Vienna.
The TVPA segregates prostitution as a distinct type of severe
trafficking and places fewer conditions on its being deemed to
be severe trafficking than on labor in any other conceivable
sector.59 The sale of sex does the work for prostitution that
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision or obtaining
of a person—plus the purposes of subjection in involuntary
services, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery—do in all other
sectors, to qualify a transaction as severe trafficking. Clearly,
the TVPA asks enforcers to regard trafficking into sex work as
categorically worse than trafficking into domestic service or
agricultural work.
Moreover, SSSF influence on the drafting of the TVPA
resulted in an anomalous series of provisions relating to
trafficking generally, without the requirement that it be
severe. A person is a “victim of trafficking” if subjected to any
of the acts detailed in the definition of “severe forms of
trafficking” quoted just above or to acts defined in the
subsequent subsection, defining “sex trafficking.” Sex
trafficking “means the recruitment, harboring, transportation,
provision or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a
commercial sex act.”60 A “commercial sex act” is defined, in
turn, as “any sex act on account of which anything of value is
given to or received by any person.”61 These provisions mark
the high water mark of SSSF influence on the drafting of the
TVPA: engaging in prostitution is per se trafficking, without
any requirement that it be coercive. Nothing in the TVPA
grants the State Department authority to condition a country’s
tier status on the degree to which it prohibits and punishes
mere trafficking: the provisions I have quoted in this
58. Id. § 103(13).
59. Chuang, supra note 53, at 467 & n.146. For other ways in which the
TVPA regime exceeds the Palermo Protocol in exceptionalizing sex work, see
id. at 467-70.
60. TVPA § 103(9).
61. Id. § 103(3).
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paragraph receive no further elaboration across the entire
expanse of the TVPA. But they are there, ready to spring to life
if SSSF pressure on Congress can ever produce legislation
directed solely to trafficking.
One of the four minimum standards set out in the TVPA
specifically focuses attention on sex trafficking, making it an
indispensable, though not the exclusive, focus of the regime.
Countries should “prescribe punishment commensurate with
that for grave crimes, such as forcible sexual assault[,]” for the
following acts: “the knowing commission of any act of sex
trafficking involving force, fraud, coercion, or in which the
victim of sex trafficking is a child incapable of giving
meaningful consent, or of trafficking which includes rape or
kidnapping or which causes a death . . . .”62 And one of the
eleven factors that the TIP office must take into account when
deciding whether minimum standards have been met is:
(11) Whether the government of the country has
made serious and sustained efforts to reduce the
demand for—
(A) commercial sex acts; and
(B) participation in international sex tourism
by nationals of the country.63
As between the SSSF position and that of the liberal/sexwork feminists, these provisions too are a draw. The idea that
prostitution is always forced or coercive was rejected: to be
severe trafficking within the TVPA, trafficking of an adult into
prostitution must also involve force, fraud, or coercion. But the
TIP Office is authorized to penalize countries that fail to make
sustained efforts to “reduce demand” for commercial sex.
“Ending demand”—for prostitution, not for other forms of
dangerous labor—is a central aim of the SSSF agenda, and it
now enjoys positive U.S. policy enforcement on a global scale.64
62. Id. § 108(a)(2).
63. 22 U.S.C. § 7106 (b)(11) (2008).
64. For the SSSF theory that “ending demand” is a promising
abolitionist vehicle, see, for example, Janice G. Raymond, Prostitution on
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The SSSF agenda in the trafficking regime is therefore to
capture its considerable enforcement resources for a global
anti-prostitution campaign. Every other element of the
international management of labor flows falls off the SSSF
agenda. In my remaining pages I will take two steps to
recontextualize trafficking, one reconnecting the Palermo
Trafficking Protocol and the TVPA to northern border control
anxieties; the other reconnecting victims of coerced sex work
with vulnerable migratory labor generally.
How intently does the Trafficking Protocol, augmented by
the TVPA, protect victims? The regime provides several
protective and/or remedial commitments for victims of
trafficking. Signatories to the Palermo Trafficking Protocol
promise to protect privacy and confidentiality of victim
information where appropriate and to the extent possible;65 to
provide victims information and an opportunity to be heard in
appropriate cases;66 to take into account the age, gender, and
special needs of victims;67 and to provide means for victims to
claim compensation.68 Article 8 commits signatories, when they
are the country of origin for a trafficking victim, to “facilitate
and accept . . . the return of [the trafficking victim] without
undue or unreasonable delay . . . but with due regard to the
safety of [the victim].”69 The Trafficking Protocol is silent on
the important human rights priority, that receiving countries
should not prosecute trafficking victims for illegal in-migration.
One could argue that this silence differentiates the Trafficking
Demand: Legalizing the Buyer as Sexual Consumer, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1156 (2004). For an argument that decontextualizing demand
produces misleading descriptive analysis and misdirected policy
recommendations, see BRIDGET ANDERSON & JULIA O’CONNELL DAVIDSON, IS
TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS DEMAND DRIVEN?: A MULTI-COUNTRY PILOT
STUDY (2003). For a recent TIP Office “Fact Sheet” largely adopting the SSSF
“end demand” platform, see OFFICE TO MONITOR & COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS, PREVENTION: FIGHTING SEX TRAFFICKING BY CURBING DEMAND FOR
PROSTITUTION
(June
2011),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/167329.pdf.
65. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 6 para. 1.
66. Id. at art. 6, para. 2(b).
67. Id. at art. 6, para. 4.
68. Id. at art. 6, para. 6.
69. Id. at art. 8, para. 1, 2.
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Protocol from the Smuggling Protocol, which provides that
receiving countries can prosecute smuggled (but not trafficked)
illegal migrants for violating domestic immigration law.70 By
implication, trafficking victims cannot be prosecuted for status
offenses. But as Gallagher reports, receiving countries worried
about their exposure to immigration categorically refused to
tolerate the insertion of a similar ban into the Trafficking
Protocol when human rights NGOs proposed one.71 The lacuna
could be read to imply not prohibition but permission.
Many of the most lauded remedies for trafficking victims
achieved at Palermo and enforced through the TVPA’s
surveillance/sanctions regime are merely recommended, not
mandatory. The Palermo Trafficking Protocol provides that
states “shall consider” “provid[ing] for the physical,
psychological and social recovery of victims . . . in appropriate
cases, in cooperation with non-governmental organizations . . .
and, in particular, [providing]: (a) Appropriate housing; (b)
Counselling and information . . . regard[ing] their legal rights .
. . ; (c) Medical, psychological, and material assistance; and (d)
Employment, educational and training opportunities.”72 They
are similarly encouraged to, but not required to, “permit
victims . . . to remain in its territory, temporarily or
permanently, in appropriate cases.”73 If they adopt a visa
program, they must “give appropriate consideration to
humanitarian and compassionate factors.”74 In the TVPA the

70. The Smuggling Protocol provides that “Nothing in this Protocol shall
prevent a State Party from taking measures against a person whose conduct
constitutes an offence under its domestic law,” Smuggling Protocol, supra
note 45, at art. 6, para. 4, and that “Migrants shall not become liable to
criminal prosecution under this Protocol for the fact of having been the object
of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol,” id. at art. 5. Article Six
contains the Protocol’s definition of human smuggling. Id. at art. 6. Thus
migrants can be liable to criminal prosecution under domestic law except
when the relevant provisions of domestic law were adopted to comply with
Protocol obligations. That is to say, the Palermo Smuggling Protocol permits
states to criminalize illegal in-migration but cannot be invoked to increase
smuggled in-migrants’ exposure to criminal sanctions.
71. Gallagher, supra note 53, at 990-91.
72. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 6, para. 3.
73. Id. at art. 7, para. 1.
74. Id. at art. 7, para. 2.
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U.S. promised to certify trafficking victims present in the U.S.
as temporary legal aliens only if they cooperated with the
prosecution of their traffickers, and only for the duration of
their cooperation.75 This was an innovation; nothing in the
Palermo regime indicates that victim cooperation may be made
a condition of their non-repatriation. Most victims would
regard cooperating with law enforcement as a seriously costly
enterprise. Inclusion of this provision in the TVPA signals that,
in the TIP enforcement system, the U.S. would permit other
countries to condition permission to stay on cooperation with
law enforcement. Finally, the Palermo Protocol provides that
repatriation “shall preferably be voluntary,”—a provision that
permits coercive repatriation (trafficking in reverse?).76 A
provision banning involuntary repatriation was proposed and
rejected at Vienna.77
Human rights advocates at Vienna were well aware that
migrants with plausible claims for refugee status and asylum
in the receiving country, and with a corresponding right to nonrefoulement to the country from which they have fled, might be
caught up in the anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling machinery
and repatriated before they could invoke protection under
refugee law.78 In the closing sessions of the Vienna process,
they managed to persuade the drafters to include in the
Smuggling Protocol a saving clause providing that “[n]othing in
this Protocol shall affect the other rights, obligations and
responsibilities of States and individuals under international
law,” explicitly including refugee law.79 That human rights
advocates had to fight so hard to obtain this victory, and that
they did so only in the closing hours of negotiation over the
75. TVPA, 22 U.S.C. § 7105 (b)(1)(E) (2006).
76. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 8, para. 2.
77. Gallagher, supra note 53, at 992.
78. Id. at 992, 994-95, 1000. See also id. at 998 (discussing the
promulgation of the Palermo Smuggling Protocol).
79. As Gallagher relates, a saving clause with the language quoted
above had already been included in the draft Trafficking Protocol, and the
battle was over human rights advocates’ insistence that it be included in the
Smuggling Protocol also. Gallagher, supra note 53, at 839-40, 840 n.209. For
the final provisions, see Trafficking Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 19, para.
1; Smuggling Protocol, supra note 45, art. 19 para. 1.
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Smuggling Protocol, signals not only how rigorously they
defended their constituencies at Vienna but also how hostile an
environment they were working in. One scents the receiving
countries’ hope that, by strengthening anti-smuggling criminal
law internationally, they could attenuate their commitments to
refugee protection. The identification or categorization of
migrants as agents of their own smuggling, victims of
trafficking or refugees has been relegated to the discretion of
law enforcement and border-control bureaucrats.
Now let us assess the idea that the Palermo/TVPA antitrafficking regime is a human rights regime. In the law on the
books, victims of trafficking are probably but not certainly
protected from criminal prosecution for illegal entry; a
receiving country may at its discretion make trafficking victims
eligible for visas allowing them to stay there legally; it may
make cooperation with law enforcement the condition of
extended legal stay; but the only remedy signatory states
committed themselves to is repatriation. Countries of origin
must accept their nationals back; and repatriation is only
preferably, not necessarily, voluntary on the part of the
trafficking victim. Narrow that further by focusing this small
remedial project on trafficked sex workers, as the Bush
administration did exclusively, and as the Obama
administration is doing predominantly. Expand it, however, by
augmenting it with the Smuggling Protocol, which makes it
easy for refugees entitled to non-refoulement, and trafficking
victims perhaps entitled to non-criminalization and even in
some receiving countries to social services and visa eligibility,
to be charged with criminal entry, detained, and deported
before they appear in the field of vision of anyone competent to,
and moved by any incentive to, determine whether they are
entitled to more protection.80
Chantal Thomas classifies the Trafficking Protocol as
international criminal law, not international human rights

80. For a convincing claim that this is happening in the U.S., see Dina
Francesca Haynes, Exploitation Nation: The Thin and Grey Legal Lines
between Trafficked Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers, 23 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 44 (2009).
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law.81 Plotting refugee law, human rights law, the conventions
of the International Labor Organization, trade law, and
international criminal law on one axis registering their
devotion to individual rights and on another registering their
policy commitment to state sovereignty, she limns in
international criminal law as purely sovereigntist: the
existence of the Trafficking Protocol does not move her to credit
international criminal law with even a blip of protection for
migratory workers.82 Implicitly she asks: How is it a human
right to be forcibly repatriated to the state which one was
fleeing, at the behest of a receiving country unwilling to allow
entry? That is border control, not human rights.
She has a point. I hope my highly abbreviated description
of the various bits of legal real estate won by SSSF and its
religious conservative allies, by receiving countries and by
human rights advocates in the construction of the antitrafficking regime allows readers to begin the process of
deciding for themselves whether they want to see the regime as

81. Chantal Thomas, Convergences and Divergences in International
Legal Norms on Migratory Labor, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 405, 437-39
(2011). Thomas analyzes bodies of international law that condition the
bargaining power of labor migrants and their families with respect to a
specific set of human rights: (1) the general right to nondiscrimination; (2)
the right of territorial entry; (3) the right to work and conditions of work; (4)
freedoms of expression, association, and assembly; and (5) criminal due
process. She accurately concludes that the Trafficking Protocol establishes no
binding obligations with respect to these specific rights. Id. at 437-39. Rather,
she concludes, its primary effect is to establish provisions for substantive and
institutional criminal law enforcement related to trafficking. Id. Indeed,
though Thomas acknowledges the hard-won savings clause discussed above,
she also correctly observes that the Protocol establishes no binding
obligations to adopt human rights measures more generally. Respect for
human rights figures in the Protocol, instead, in aspirational language, for
instance, stating as a central purpose the respect for victims’ human rights,
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 2, requesting State Parties to “give
appropriate consideration” to humanitarian concerns, id. at art. 7, and
requesting State Parties to “take into account” victims’ human rights as part
of law enforcement training, id. at art. 10. Thomas, Convergences and
Divergences, at 437-39. For all these reasons, Thomas has characterized the
document elsewhere as prioritizing border control and criminal law
enforcement over victims’ human rights. Thomas in Halley et al., supra note
40, at 388-90.
82. Thomas, supra note 81, at 437-39.
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Thomas does or in more optimistic terms.
I myself am reluctantly inclined to join Thomas in a
pessimistic reading of the new anti-trafficking regime. Without
doubt it does include levers which hard-working advocates for
endangered and coerced migrants can work with. It is
important to identify and use them, to teach them to our
students, and to support their expansion wherever possible.
But to misconstrue a border-control regime that grants a few
penurious protections for migrants as a human rights regime
offering categorical succor to some of the world’s most
vulnerable populations is to legitimate the basic message of
that border-control regime: however bad it is for you in your
passport country, that is where the countries participating in
the anti-trafficking regime have determined that you should
stay. Similarly, making an international spectacle of rescuing
migrant workers from coerced exploitation effectively
legitimates non-coerced exploitation. The narrowness of these
exceptions proves their rules. In the background, the passport
system buttresses the superior bargaining power of
international capital as it manages its need for exploitable
labor. And progressives barely realize that they lack a legal
and political vocabulary for describing and addressing the
plight of workers who must consent to their own exploitation or
starve.83
SSSF has fostered this misprision. The widespread capture
of anti-trafficking by SSSF and religious conservative antiprostitution, and the almost ubiquitous representation of
prostitution as an extreme form of victimization, helped to
make it possible to represent this largely (though not
exclusively) criminal legal order as a human rights regime.
Exaggerating the human rights commitment of the antitrafficking regime in this way legitimates border control; the
organized forgetting of anti-trafficking as border control fosters
widespread inattention to the potentially devastating
consequences for labor migrants both of falling outside and of

83. I have just reproduced key moves in the legal realist critique of
rights, with thanks to Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923).
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coming within the scope of the Trafficking Protocol’s
protections.84 Meanwhile, the trafficking of women into
relatively safe or acutely dangerous labor market sectors other
than sex work falls into oblivion; and the trafficking of men
goes almost entirely dark. For feminists, this cascade of
misprisions remains either common sense or confusingly
difficult to resist, not only because feminists remain loyal to
M/F, M>F, and carrying a brief for F, but because they assume
that sex for sale, as paradigmanic bad sex, is marked off from
other exploited labor by a family/market distinction.
Let us try to pick up the resulting legal event not by the
handle labeled “bad sex”—but instead by the handle labeled
“safe migration.” For an example, consider a 2004 report to the
International Organization on Migration by the Bangladesh
Thematic Group on Trafficking (BTGT), entitled Revisiting the
Human Trafficking Paradigm: The Bangladesh Experience
(Part I: Trafficking of Adults).85 The BTGT gathered
observations about relatively successful and dangerous
migration from migrants themselves, from experts on
international migration, and from aid workers directly serving
migrant communities. It was an international labor law
initiative, not a trafficking initiative. The image of endangered
cross-border labor migration that it generated was profoundly
different from the one currently sustained by anti-trafficking
rhetoric and practice.
The BTGT developed a “matrix” or “flowchart” assembling
the background conditions, both social and legal, against which
people decide to migrate, actually migrate, and either enjoy or
suffer various “migration outcome[s].”86 The Group sorted
factors that lead to a “Harm/Problem” outcome87 and those that

84. GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN (GAATW),
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE IMPACT OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING MEASURES ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD (2007).
85. BANGLADESH THEMATIC GROUP ON TRAFFICKING, REVISITING THE
HUMAN TRAFFICKING PARADIGM: THE BANGLADESH EXPERIENCE (PART I:
TRAFFICKING OF ADULTS) (2004).
86. Id. at 40.
87. Id. at 30.
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lead to a “No-Harm/Safe Migration Outcome”88 into
subcategories and then scrutinized all of these factors for
deeper enabling and disabling contributing conditions.
Trafficking was not the modal migratory experience; indeed,
trafficking was classified as kidnapping, not migration at all.89
Migration on this model is by definition voluntary at some
level, however compelling the conditions which cause
particular migrants to go in motion. And outcomes that result
in sex work are equivalent to those that place migrants in
domestic labor, industrial work, and agricultural labor: all of
them can sustain safe and unsafe outcomes.90 The conditions of
work in various industries, not the kind of work done there,
indicate whether the work is harmful or safe.
The Report works inductively up to legal remedies from a
highly diversified set of descriptors for a highly contingent but
comprehensive array of migrant experiences. The BTGT
constantly scoured cells in its matrix for conditions that could
be changed to conduce towards safer migration. For instance, a
segment of the flowchart looked beyond criminal enforcement
for legal and policy tools fostering safe migration and
intensifying the danger of some migrants’ experiences.91 (This
page is reproduced below as Appendix 1.) And another
envisioned ways to keep anti-trafficking enforcement from
further victimizing “trafficked persons[.]”92 (This page is
reproduced below as Appendix 2.) Policies that discourage
households of origin from sending members into dangerous
migration receive just as much attention as criminalization,93
and socio-economic reintegration of trafficked persons depends
just as much on policies aimed at strengthening the extended
family as those targeting the community and the workplace.94
The BTGT Report uncannily tracks the Wallerstein/Smith
analytic, so that the wellbeing of an economically desperate
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 74.
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person on the verge of illegal migration is understood to depend
on market opportunities and household lifeways. The dynamics
the Group sought to make intelligible require us to cast our
eyes across the family/market divide.
This shift has implications for legal methodology. One of
the biggest mistakes that SSSF made was to imagine that law
does what it says it will do, so that, if they managed to build
their vision of sexual injustice and sexual emancipation with
the stuff of law, the law would put an end to the former and
move us towards the latter. Many of us who question the
abolitionist effort in prostitution and trafficking, for instance,
do so because we do not believe commercial sex will be
eliminated because it is prohibited: we think it may instead
persist, go underground, and become more dangerous. We
think the safety and wages of sex workers could well decline,
subject to the same forces that may cause their clientele to
become more insensitive to risk. The economic desperation that
so commonly motivates women (and men) to turn to sex work
will not go away either: partial criminalization may cause them
to divert their energies from the sex industry to some other
labor market, but they won’t necessarily be safer or better paid
there. They may become less able to bring income to their
households and more dependent on their households to feed,
clothe, and house them.
These distributional outcomes cannot be spoken in the
abolitionist legal vocabulary: to articulate them, you need
something like the BTGT’s highly realist approach. They made
their flowcharts by adopting the point of view of migrants, not
on a collapsed continuum of harm but on a spectrum ranging
widely across individual experiences and temporally within any
one migrants’ experience. They asked how the legal regimes
that migrants actually come into contact with create
bargaining endowments that condition their interactions with
people and institutions all along the chain of migration. It is
not just the lurid moment of coercion that captures their
attention but the background rules and background conditions
that make it more or less likely to happen. The same impulse
animated the UAFLE conference to build the Family Law
1/Family Law 2/Family Law 3 analytic appears in the BTGT’s
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flowcharts as its multiplicity of conditioning institutions and
social practices.
I offer Revisiting the Human Trafficking Paradigm: The
Bangladesh Experience as an experiment in feminist legal
realism, unbounded by a rigid commitment to female
subordination/male dominance as the sine qua non of gender
and fluidly capable of noticing human welfare and human
vulnerability as they emerge dynamically across the
family/market distinction. In dealing with this striking new
strand of feminist thought and action, I think we can find ways
to move, in our work on international law, beyond women,
beyond even gender, even beyond minority groups, to study and
address human welfare and human vulnerability across the
household/market nexus.
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Appendix I
Revisiting the Human Trafficking
Paradigm:
The Bangladesh Experience
(Part I: Trafficking of Adults)
Page 54
Reproduced by permission of the
International Organization for Migration
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Appendix II
Revisiting the Human Trafficking
Paradigm:
The Bangladesh Experience
(Part I: Trafficking of Adults)
Page 58
Reproduced by permission of the
International Organization for Migration
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